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AFTER SEATTLE: IS THERE A FUTURE
FOR TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY

RULE-MAKING?
Mark A. A. Warner, Esq.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A great deal has been written and spoken about the "new"
trade issue of the relationship between competition and trade
policy since the beginning of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations.' With the passage of time, it is tempting to no
longer see this as a new issue at all. However, because of the
limited progress made to date in terms of translating this
cacophony into actual rule-making, the trade and competition
interface arguably still qualifies as a new issue. This paper
will assess the prospects for further multilateral rule-making
in this area, particularly in light of the suspension of the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") Ministerial Meeting in
Seattle in late November 1999.
That being said, experience to date with the General
Agreement on Trade in Services ("GATS")2 negotiations demonstrates that issues of competition, and competition policy,
will be critical, in many sectors, to the willingness of WTO
members to liberalize their trade in services. The question
then arises: How should issues of competition, and competition

* International AntitrustITrade Counsel, Hushes Hubbard & Reed, New
York, formerly Legal Counsel, Trade Directorate of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation & Development, Paris, France. Mr. Warner is a member of the Bars
of New York State, and Ontario, Canada. He is also: a past Chair of the International Antitrust Committee of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust
Law; Adjunct Professor of international competition law at the University of
Leiden in the Netherlands; and co-author of the leading Canadian trade law treatise - The Law and Practice of International Trade in Canada. E-mail:
mark.warner@oecd.org or clamar@ibm.net. Mr. Warner's views do not necessarily
reflect the views of the OECD or any of its member states.
1. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 1

33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter Annex].
2. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement];
Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33

I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter GATS Agreement].
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policy, enter into these negotiations? One approach may be to
pursue negotiations relating to a horizontal competition agreement on trade-related aspects of anti-trust measures
(' TRAMs"). 3 Another approach, however, is to build on the
existing competition provisions of the GATS in future sectoral
negotiations, or in even more horizontal. understandings of
principles of domestic regulation with respect to services.
This paper will examine the prospects for achieving, and
the relative strengths and weaknesses of, both approaches. The
first section of the paper examines the state of multilateral
competition policy rule-making. The second section of the paper discusses the existing competition policy provisions in the
GATS. The third section of the paper examines the ways in
which competition policy concerns might arise in particular
service sector negotiations. The paper will conclude that both
approaches to negotiations are not mutually exclusive, and
therefore could be pursued in parallel.

II. MULTILATERAL COMPETITION POLICY RULE-MAKING
At the outset, it is worth distinguishing between two ways
of conceptualizing potential rule-making with respect to competition policy. One approach deals with the international aspects
of competition law enforcement.4 This could include a consideration of issues of cooperation and coordination between and
among competition law authorities. This cooperation and coordination could be with respect to either investigations of private anti-competitive measures, or the enforcement of remedies
for such conduct. This cooperation, and coordination could be
across the full panoply of competition policy concerns, or it
could be focused on particular areas such as prohibiting cartels, and reviewing mergers. This form of rule-making could
take the form of binding obligations or the expression of nonbinding principles, the relevance of which Members consider on

3. See Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez et al., Future Challenges: New Substantive
Areas, 32 INT'L LAW 993 (1998); Friedl Weiss, From World Trade Law to World
Competition Law, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 250 (2000); Hyung Jung, A Comparative

Study on the Question of ExtraterritorialApplication of the Competition Law, 18
DICK. J. INTL L. 305 (2000); Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market
Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997).
4. See Jung, supra note 3, at n.143 (citing Professor Ernst Ulrich
Petersmann's three approaches to international competition law problems).
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a case by case basis.'
Another approach to conceptualizing multilateral rulemaking with respect to competition policy is to focus on traditional trade concerns with trade distortions and market access.6 This approach would emphasize establishing the significant anti-competitive measures that have a substantial impact
on international trade, and then negotiating appropriate rules
to either prohibit, or discipline such measures. This approach
would not necessarily focus solely on the role of competition
law authorities. Rather, it would be aimed at core principles to
which Members would agree to be bound in order to make
their other trade liberalization commitments more robust.7
A. The OECD
To date, most progress on rule-making, arguably, has been
achieved with respect to the first approach At the multilateral level, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD"),' not the WTO, has been the institutional
forum for that work. Specifically, the OECD Competition Law
and Policy Committee (the "CLP") ° has generated a number
of Recommendations of the OECD Council of Ministers." Notable examples of these are the 1998 Recommendation Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels ("HCC
Recommendation")12 and the 1995 Revised Recommendation
Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on
Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade ("Cooperation Recommendation"). 1 3 As with all Recommendations,

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Weiss, supra note 3, at 250.
9. OECD, About Us, at httpJ/www.oecd.org/daf/elp/aboutus.htm (last visited
Aug. 27, 2000).
10. Id.
11. OECD, Recommendations of the OECD Council Related to Competition
Law and Policy, at http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/recommendations/rec9com.htm (last
visited Aug. 22, 2000).
12. OECD, Recommendations at the Council Concerning Effective Action
Against
Hard
Core
Cartels,
at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/clp/recommendations/rec9com.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2000).
13. OECD, Revised Recommendation of the Council, at http://www.oecd.org/daflclp/recommendations/rec8com.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2000).
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these are non-binding instruments. 4 There is no particular
form of dispute settlement provided in either Recommendation. 5 At most, under the HCC Recommendations, the CLP
can serve as a forum for consultations on the application of the
Recommendation upon the request "of the Member countries
involved." 6 Under the Cooperation Recommendation, 7 the
CLP can serve as a forum for exchange of views on matters related to the Recommendation "on the understanding that it
will not reach conclusions on the conduct of individual enterprises or governments". 8 Further, the CLP can consider requests for conciliation submitted by Member Countries, and
can assist "by offering advice or by any other means, in the
settlement of the matter between the Member countries involved." 9
Not surprisingly, the dispute settlement provisions - such
as they are - of these non-binding Recommendations have
never been used. Absent a substantial change of heart among
OECD Member Countries, it is likely that they will never be
used. Countries so far seem quite hesitant to multilateralize
their bilateral competition policy disputes.
Part of the reason for this reluctance may be based on the
rather vague and imprecise nature of these consensus Recommendations. For instance, the HCC Recommendation defines a
"hard core cartel" as "an anticompetitive agreement,
anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix prices, make rigged bids (collusive
tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or
divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or
lines of commerce."" In the United States, however, the adjectival phrase "hard core" in relatiop to cartels is restricted to
a limited class of per se offenses for which no proof of anticompetitive effects would be required.2 '

14. See OECD, supra note 11.
15. See OECD, supra note 12. See also OECD, supra note 13.
16. OECD, supra note 12, at 3.
17. OECD, supra note 13, at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 4.
20. OECD, supra note 12, at 2.
21. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Japan Concerning Co-operation on Anti-Competitive Activities, Oct. 7, 1999, U.S.-Japan, DEP'T ST. BULL. No. 99-137.
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Accordingly, vague consensus Recommendations that neither reflect Member Countries' existing laws, nor require
change in such laws to reflect the Recommendations are not
conducive to binding, or even non-binding dispute settlement.
A second reason for the limited use of these dispute settlement
provisions is that the CLP does not appear to have adopted
guidelines for the conduct of such proceedings, in particular, to
deal with any relevant confidential information that might
have to be disclosed in order for the matter to be adjudicated,
or to provide for working parties consisting of less than all
CLP members, to serve as the forum.
In fairness, it should be noted that the CLP has functioned
more successfully as a forum for promoting convergence of
competition policies among Members Countries, and also as a
forum for providing useful technical assistance to certain Observers 22 and non-Member countries." There may well be an
inherent tension between the CLP's role as a forum for promoting convergence and its role as a dispute settlement forum,
which may also account for its reluctance to embrace the dispute settlement function to date.
Similar competition provisions exist in certain bilateral
competition policy enforcement agreements. However, none of
these appear to be fully binding, or subject to dispute settlement. That being said, to a limited extent, the HCC Recommendation,2 4 with all of its attendant weaknesses, may demonstrate that countries can agree to certain core principles or
common approaches (if not common standards) to dealing with
particular anti-competitive measures. That in itself might be a
useful element in any architecture for competition policy rulemaking in the services context.
B. The Existing WTO Agreements
With respect to the second approach to competition policy
rule-making - commitments relating to trade distortions and
market access25 - there has been precious little progress to

22. OECD, Non-Member Activities, at http'/lwww.oecd.orgtdaflclp/
nonmember.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2000).
23. Id.
24. OECD, supra note 12.
25. See Jung, supra note 3.
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date. In terms of the WTO Agreements, putting the GATS
aside because it will be discussed more fully below,2" it is possible to identify a number of competition provisions." For instance, in GATT 1947, article II:4 deals to some degree with
import monopolies; articles 111:2 and III:429 deal with maintaining the competitive conditions between domestic goods and
imported like products; article XI prohibits certain import and
export related quantitative restrictions; and article XVII deals
with certain conditions for state trading enterprises. 30 Article
11:1(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards provides that "a Member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar
measures on the export or the import side."3 1 The "similar
measures" are specified to include "export moderation, exportprice or import-price monitoring systems, export or import
surveillance, compulsory import cartels, and discretionary export or import licensing schemes, any of which afford protection"3 2 to the importing country's industry. Furthermore, article 11:3 provides that "[Miembers shall not encourage or support the adoption or maintenance by public and private enterprises of non-governmental measures equivalent to those referred to in paragraph i."M Additionally, the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights34 also
contains provisions35 on licensing that are arguably related to
competition law and policy.
As a formal matter, competition policy per se arises only

26. GATS Agreement, supra note 2.
27. OECD, Competition Elements in International Trade Agreements: A Post
Uruguay Round Overview of WTO Agreements (Jan. 28, 1999) at
http'//www.oecd.org/daflclp(98)26/FINAL.
28. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, art. 2, para. 4 [hereinafter GATT].
29. Id. at arts. 3, 17.
30. Id. at arts. 11, 17.
31. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2,
at Annex IA, reprinted in LAW & PRACTICE OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
(Oceana Publications Inc. 1999) [hereinafter Law & Practice].

32. Id. at n.4.
33. Id. at art. 2, para. 3.
34. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS

Agreement].
35. Id. at arts. 21, 40.
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indirectly in article 9 of the Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures ("TRIMs Agreement"). 36 Article 9 provides
that by the end of 1999, the Council for Trade in Goods shall
review the operation of the TRIMs Agreement and, as appropriate, propose to the Ministerial Conference amendments to
its text.3 ' Furthermore, in the course of this review, the Council for Trade in Goods shall consider whether it should be complemented with provisions on investment policy and competition policy.

C. The Singapore MinisterialAgreement
At the WTO Ministerial Conference held in Singapore in
December 1996,8 the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy ("WGTCP") was the
Working Group on Trade and Investment. 39 This group were
instructed to draw upon each other's work if necessary, and
also to draw upon and be without prejudice toward the work in
UNCTAD4" and other appropriate intergovernmental organizations such as the OECD. The Ministerial Declaration further

36. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO
Agreement, supra note 2, Annex IB, reprinted in Law & Practice, supra note 31
[hereinafter TRIMS Agreement].
37. Id. at art. 9.
38. Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO, 36 I.L.M. 218 (1996) available at
http'/www.cvpinstitute.org/links/singapor.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000) [hereinafter Singapore Ministerial Declaration].
39. Id. at para. 20. The relevant paragraph of the Ministerial Declaration
provides that:
Having regard to the existing WTO provisions on matters related to investment and competition policy and the built-in
agenda in these areas, including under the TRIMs Agreement,
and on the understanding that the work undertaken shall not
prejudge whether negotiations will be initiated in the future, we
also agree to:
a. establish a working group to examine the relationship between trade and investment; and
b. establish a working group to study issues raised by
Members relating to the interaction between trade and
competition policy including anti-competitive practices,
in order to identify any areas that may merit further
consideration in the WTO framework.
40. Id.
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clarified that "[ilt is clearly understood that future negotiations, if any, regarding multilateral disciplines in these areas,
will take place only after an explicit consensus decision is
taken among WTO Members regarding such negotiations." 1
The General Council was instructed to keep the work of each
body under review, and to determine after two years how the
work of each body should proceed. In December 1998, the mandate of the WGTCP was extended and refined to " ... continue
the educative work that it has been undertaking pursuant to
paragraph 20 of the Singapore Ministerial Declaration."4 2 To
this point, the WGTCP has served primarily as a useful educational forum for the discussion of competition policy among a
range of developed and developing countries, and only secondarily as a pre-negotiation forum. Among the items considered
by the WGTCP in the first two years of its mandate were:
a. The Relationship between the objectives, principles, concepts, scope and instruments of trade and competition policy;
their relationship to development and economic growth.43
b. Stocktaking and analysis of existing instruments, standards and activities regarding trade and competition policy,
including of experience with their application: national competition policies, laws and instruments as they relate to

41. Id.

42. WTO, Report of the Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade and
Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP2, para. 154 (Dec. 8, 1998).
In the light of the limited number of meetings that the group will be
able to hold in 1999, the Working Group, while continuing at each
meeting to base its work on the study of issues raised by Members
relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy,
including anti-competitive practices, would benefit from a focused discussion on: i) the relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national treatment, transparency, and most-favoured-nation treatment to
competition policy and vice versa; (ii) approaches to promoting cooperation and communication among Members, including in the field of
technical cooperation; and (iii) the contribution of competition policy
to achieving the objectives of the WTO, including the promotion of
international trade. The Working Group will continue to ensure that
the development dimension and the relationship with investment are
fully taken into account. It is understood that this decision is without prejudice to any future decision that might be taken by the General Council, including in the context of its existing work programme.
43. Id. at para. 18-31.
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trade; existing WTO provisions; bilateral, regional,
plurilateral and multilateral agreements and initiatives."
c. The Interaction between trade and competition policy: the
impact of anti-competitive practices of enterprises and associations on international trade; the impact of state monopolies,
exclusive rights and regulatory policies on competition and
international trade; the relationship between the trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and competition
policy; the relationship between investment and competition
policy; and, the impact of trade policy on competition.45
The WGTCP's work program prior to December 1998, included the identification of many areas that may merit further
consideration in the WTO framework, however it never
reached that point in its deliberations. It remains to be seen
whether in this second phase of the work of the WGTCP, it
will move to more of a pre-negotiation or negotiation mode. At
this stage, it seems unlikely that the WGTCP will move to
much of a negotiation mode because the parties' positions of
still seem fairly far apart. Nonetheless, it still may be useful to
canvass the positions of major players to assess the implications for horizontal competition policy rule-making with respect to the liberalization of trade in services.

D. The European Union
The European Union (EU) has, perhaps, the most expansive proposal for horizontal rule-making about competition
policy. The Communication from the Commission to the
Council and to the European Parliament on the EU Approach
to the Millennium Round4" enumerates four elements on the
negotiation of a binding framework of multilateral rules on
competition as part of a comprehensive Round. The four elements are:
a. Core principles and common rules relating to the adoption

44. Id. at para. 32-43.
45. Id. at para. 65-71.
46. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, at http://europa.eu.intcomm/tradepdf/O807nr.pdf (last modified Dec. 13,
1999).
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of competition law and its enforcement (i.e. a commitment to
adopt a comprehensive competition law, limits on sectoral
exclusions, application of principles of transparency and nondiscrimination, rights of firms, and private actions in national courts);47

b. Common approaches on anti-competitive practices with a
significant impact on international trade and investment (i.e.
hard core cartels, criteria for assessment of vertical restrictions or abuses of dominance with a foreclosure effect, princi-

ples 48for cooperation on export cartels and international mergers);
c.

Provisions on international cooperation, which could in-

clude provisions on notification, consultation, and surveillance in relation to anticompetitive practices with an international dimension, exchanges of non-confidential information,

and positive and negative comity (although without a binding
obligation to investigate on behalf of another country);
d. Dispute Settlement to ensure that the domestic competition law enforcement structures are in accordance with the
multilaterally agreed principles, but in no event should there
be a review of individual decisions.49

Finally, with respect to dispute settlement, the EC position appears to be that WTO panels should consider whether a
Member is in breach of the core principles,5 0 or whether its
competition law appropriately covers the common approaches.
61
This dispute settlement would not apply in individual cases,
and not in respect of positive comity.52 Although there ap47. The EU Approach to the WTO Millennium Round, COM(99)331/FINAL
[hereinafter Millennium Round].
48. Id.
49. The Rt. Hon. Sir Leon Brittan QC, Vice President of the European Commission, The Need for a Multilateral Framework of Competition Rules, Keynote
Address to the OECD Conference on Trade and Competition (June 29, 1999) [hereinafter Brittan Keynote Address]; The Rt. Hon. Sir Leon Britton QC, The Contribution of the WTO Millennium Round to Globalization: An EU View, Address at
the First Herbert Batliner Symposium: Europe in the Era of Globalisation - Economic Order and Economic Law (Apr. 29, 1999); Karel Van Miert, EC Commissioner for Competition, The WTO and Competition Policy: The Need to Consider
Negotiations, Address before Ambassadors to the WTO (Apr. 21, 1998).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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pears to be wide consensus that dispute settlement should not
apply to individual cases because of the complex and fact intensive nature of competition law and policy, it is worth noting
that the WTO already deals with complex and fact intensive
cases under the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement")5 3 or involving environmental measures.5 4 It should also be noted that article
13:2 of the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes provides that panels may
seek the counsel of experts with respect to "a factual issue
concerning a scientific, or other technical matter raised by a
party to a dispute."55
As proposed, the dispute settlement would apply to alleged
patterns of failure to enforce competition law in cases affecting
international trade and investment.5 It is not clear how this

53. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex IA, reprinted in Law & Practice, supra note 31.
54. See United States - Measures Concerning Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body (WT/DS58/AB/R October 12, 1998); EC - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
Decision by the Arbitrators, (WTIDS48/ARB July 12, 1999); Australia - Measures
Affecting Importation of Salmon, Award of the Arbitrator, (WT/DS18/9 Feb. 23,
1999); Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, Report of the Appellate
Body, (WT/DS76/AB/R Feb. 22, 1999). See generally Gary N. Horlick, The World
Trading System at the Crossroad of Science and Politics, Paper Presented to the
Columbia University Conference on The Next Trade Negotiating Round: Examining
the Agenda for Seattle (New York, July 22-23, 1999) (on file with the author); and
Thomas Cottier, SPS Risk Assessment and Risk Management in WTO Dispute
Settlement: Experience and Lessons, Paper Prepared for the Conference on Risk
Analysis and International Agreements (Feb. 10-11, 1999).
55. Understanding on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex 2, reprinted in
Handbook of WTO/GATT Dispute Settlement (2000). Professor Frederic Jenny,
Vice-Chair of the French Competition Council, Chair of the WTO Working Group
on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, and Chair of the OECD
Competition Law and Policy Committee has recently made this point, and also
noted that similar provisions can be found in the SPS Agreement and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. See Agreement on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Preamble, WTO Agreement, supra note 2, Annex IA [hereinafter TBT Agreement]. See Frederic Jenny, Paper Presented to the Columbia University Conference on The Next Trade Negotiating Round: Examining the Agenda
for Seattle (July 22-23, 1999) (on file with the author).
56. See Brittan Keynote Address, supra note 49. "Furthermore, we have been
reflecting within the Community on whether dispute settlement should also apply
to a pattern of non-enforcement of domestic competition law. My personal view is
that once such a pattern has been established, it should also be subject to some
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dispute settlement proposal could practically avoid judging
individual cases, especially when what is alleged is a pattern
of non-enforcement. Presumably, this will be clarified in subsequent interventions from the EU. In this regard, it is worth
considering the observations of U.S. Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Joel Klein, stating that he doesn't "know what
it means to say.., that individual cases will not be reviewed
but that a 'pattern' may be; a pattern is a series of individual
cases, and even if the whole were greater than the sum of its
parts, any meaningful dispute resolution powers in this field
could not ignore the parts."57

E. The United States
In contrast, the U.S. position is much less comprehensive.
The U.S. antitrust agencies - the Department of Justice and
the Federal Trade Commission - favor an approach that emphasizes bilateral cooperation and coordination in investigation
and enforcement. This has sometimes been described as an
attempt to multilateralize the Canada-U.S. approach to enforcement cooperation and coordination.5 8 This approach emphasizes the use of treaties on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and inter-agency cooperation agreements,"
which include positive comity provisions, but not the automatic
deferral mechanism as in the U.S-EU context."
This U.S. approach is based largely on the development of
U.S. antitrust law over time under a "common law," judgedriven case by case model.6 ' Accordingly, the United States
appropriate form of dispute settlement." Id. See also Y. Mheta, Director of EC
Competition Directorate, Speech to the 3rd WTO Symposium on Competition Policy
and the Multilateral System (April 17, 1999).
57. See Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice, Address to the OECD Conference on Trade and Competition (June 30, 1999), at http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jik97220.htm.
58. See Joel I. Klein, Criminal Enforcement in a Globalized Economy (Feb. 20,
1997), at http:I/www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/jik97220.htm. See also Joel I.
Klein, Anticipating The Millennium: International Antitrust Enforcement At The
End Of The Twentieth Century (Oct. 16, 1997), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
speeches/1233.htm.
59. See Joel I. Klein, Criminal Enforcement in a Globalized Economy (Feb. 20,
1997), at http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicspeeches/jik97220.htm.
60. Id.
61. See A. Douglas Melamed, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General,
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seeks to replicate over time through a network of cooperation
agreements with countries that already have competition laws,
technical assistance to encourage the adoption of competition
laws in those countries without competition laws, and convergence though dialogue in fora such as the OECD CLP, the
WTO WGTCP, and other regional fora.62 The U.S. (like Canada and the EU) also supports the notion of "peer review" on
competition law and policy matters using the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism ("TPRM) modeled on the OECD experience with country reviews in the area of regulatory reform.'
In November 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno and
Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Joel Klein, established an International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC). 4 ICPAC was co-chaired by former Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Jim Rill and a former Commissioner of the International Trade Commission, Paula Stern.
The Committee included a few leading scholars with knowledge about both trade and competition policy such as Professor
Eleanor Fox of New York University, Professor David Yoffie of
Harvard University and Professor Merit Janow of Columbia
University (who served as Project Director). The remaining
Committee members were drawn from the business and legal
communities, though it appears that their participation with
all but a very few exceptions was extremely sparse.'
ICPAC issued its Final Report on February 28, 2000.66
The Report itself is very comprehensive, however, and anyone
looking for an impetus for a much broader U.S. engagement
with respect to multilateral rule-making on competition and
trade policy will most likely be disappointed. Indeed, in a Sep-

Antitrust Division, U.S. Department Of Justice, Speech to the 3rd WTO Symposium on Competition Policy and the Multilateral System (Apr. 17, 1999). See also
Robert Pitofsky, Remarks to the European Institute's Eighth Annual Transatlantic
Seminar on Trade and Investment (Nov. 4, 1998).
62. Charlene Barchefsky, Ambassador, Keynote Address to the Global Trading
System - A GAIT 50th Anniversary Forum, The Brookings Institution (Mar. 4,
1998).
63. OECD, supra note 12, at 3.
64. Charter, International Competitiveness Advisory Committee (Oct. 3, 1997),
at http'/www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpacticpacl.htm.
65. International
Competition
Policy
Advisory
Committee,
at
http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpacticpac3.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2000).
66. See Executive Summary, DEP'T OF JUST., at http'J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/execsummary.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2000) thereinafter Report].
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arate Statement,6 7 "embracing but going beyond"" the
ICPAC Report, Professor Eleanor Fox suggested that the Committee had "push[ed] from below to achieve more robust national antitrust enforcement [and] suggest[ed], more tentatively, global cooperation."6 9
Chapters Two and Three of the Report make detailed
recommendations with respect to multijurisdictional mergers,70 and Chapter Four makes further recommendations regarding international cartel enforcement and interagency cooperation.7 ' On a preliminary reading, each of these chapters
make modest but interesting proposals that, if adopted, should
ease some of the transaction costs faced by businesses in mergers, and should facilitate more cooperation among national
competition authorities (particularly with respect to cartels). I
hasten to add that "modest" does not mean easily implemented. Some suggestions, relating to changing existing merger
notification thresholds,7 2 review periods 3 and timing requirements, 4 may not be easy to implement in the United
States. That is also true in other jurisdictions which are unlikely to link an "appreciable nexus to the jurisdiction" 75 standard unilaterally.
Chapter Five considers a variety of acts of governments
and firms that can restrict international trade. The chapter
concludes that neither trade nor antitrust policy tools provide
complete solutions to the problems from the mix of government
and private restraints. The Report offers two policy approaches
to address the problem: more positive comity 6 and more unilateral extraterritorial enforcement of antitrust enforcement.77
Professor Fox, in her Separate Statement, in effect, politely
and eloquently dissented from the last half of this conclusion.
She said: "[she] believes that solutions, to be legitimate, inclu-

67. See Eleanor M. Fox, Separate Statement of Advisory Committee Member,
at http:J/www.usdoj.gov/atr/icpac/la.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Report, supra note 66, at 3.
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id.
73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.

76. See Report, supra note 66, at 20.
77. Id.
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sive and complete, must be multilateral, and that we must
devote more energies to strengthening and constitutionalizing
78
the WTO."
The Report suggests that the WTO continue to focus on
governmental restraints rather than addressing either purely
private or hybrid (government and private) restraints on
trade. 9 The Report suggests that the U.S. Government should
support and pursue additional incremental steps to deepen the
work of the WGTCP by pursuing an illustrative and educational agenda."0 However, a majority of the Committee were of
the view that the WTO should not develop competition rules
under its umbrella."' Nonetheless, in Chapter Six, entitled
"Preparations for the Future," the Committee recommends the
creation of a Global Competition Initiative ("GCI") that would
act as a sort of G7 for competition policy enforcers. 2 Despite
the modest tone of most of the Committee recommendations,
here the Committee goes much further and actually suggests
that the GCI be equipped for international mediation of competition disputes.'
In September 2000, days before stepping down as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Joel Klein endorsed
ICPAC's GCI proposal." In doing so, he repeated that the
WTO was inappropriate forum for discussing competition policy issues. With respect to the OECD, while praising its recent
work on hard core cartels, mergers and positive comity, Klein
argued that its limited membership would preclude it from
playing anything other than a supportive or coordinating role
in moving the GCI forward. 5 Therefore, as a first step he
proposed that:

[Interested jurisdictions along with the international bodies
already thinking about these issues-e.g., the OECD, WTO,

78. Fox, supra note 67.
79. Report, supra note 66.
80. Id.
81. International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, supra note 65.
82. Report, supra note 66.
83. Id.
84. See Joel I. Klein, Time for a Global Competition Initiative (Sept. 20, 2000),
at httpg/www.usdoj.gov/atr/publicdspeeches/6486.htm.
85. Id.
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UNCTAD, World Bank, and others-might establish a joint
working group: first for exchanging information and views
(e.g., about ongoing and planned activities, common challenges, approaches each are taking to support sound enforcement
practices, areas that are most vexing, greatest opportunities
for cooperation, etc.) and then for fully exploring a Global
Competition Initiative along the lines laid out in the ICPAC
report. In addition, these groups should develop a coordinated
and expanded commitment to technical assistance for emerging competition authorities that is essential if we are to develop a global common language.8 6
Klein's successor, Acting Assistant Attorney General for
Antitrust, A. Douglas Malamed has given further shape to the
GCI proposal. 7 In his comments, he reviewed four options for
achieving coherence of international antitrust enforcement:
bilateral discussions between two or a very few antitrust agencies; discussions, consensus-building, and voluntary undertakings in regional and multilateral fora, such as the OECD; negotiation of binding antitrust in the WTO; and building multilateral antitrust consensus through a GC.
He observed
that as a practical matter bilateral cooperation was by its
nature a limited option because "as a practical matter be duplicated on a worldwide basis for 90-odd antitrust agencies with
very different economies, legal systems, and experiences." 9
As for the OECD,he observed that its mandate was too broad,
and its membership too narrow for it to serve as a as "vehicle
for enhancing convergence on more focused matters among the
broad range of antitrust laws and agencies in today's world.""
As for binding rules in the WTO, he repeated the mantra that
"the WTO is not, in any event, a suitable forum for negotiation
of antitrust rules, and the cause of encouraging sound antitrust enforcement in world markets would be undermined by
the application of WTO dispute settlement procedures to the
kind of abstract rules that would result from negotiations in
that forum."91 Noting that bilateral cooperation and consen-

86. Id.
87. A. Douglas Malamed, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, Pro.
moting Sound Antitrust Enforcement in the Global Economy (Oct. 19, 2000).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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sus-building through the OECD should remain central components of any international antitrust policy arsenal, he concluded that none of these three options offers a complete solution
to the practical difficulties raised by the internationalization of
antitrust. 2
As for the GCI, Malamed proposed that its mandate could
resemble, at least roughly speaking, that of the OECD" despite
having noted earlier that the OECD mandate was too broad.9 3
To be more precise, he proposed that:
[Tihe GCI would be a forum for study, evaluation and recommendation. It could provide a mechanism for peer review and
could work to encourage consensus for action-much as the
OECD helped forge consensus with its recommendation on
hard core cartels. [He does) not, however, envision the GCI as
a forum for the negotiation or implementation of international agreements.94
To Malamed, the benefit of such a GCI would be:
[T]o develop an increasingly shared view of the appropriate
role for and methods of antitrust enforcement. Developing
shared views will reduce differences in the implementation of
antitrust laws and build trust among antitrust agencies;
could result in greater cooperation in individual investigations; and, perhaps in some circumstances, could even lead to
an increased role for deference and comity in international
antitrust enforcement. If in the future we can safely conclude
that deferring to another antitrust agency on a matter particularly within its jurisdiction would not sacrifice our own
legitimate sovereign interests, then antitrust agencies, consumers, and businesses alike will be able to benefit
from
95
more efficient international antitrust enforcement.
Malamed correctly identified that funding the GCI from
either an institutional or technical assistance point of view
would be a determining factor in judging its success. It is too
early to determine whether this proposal will gain support
outside of U.S. government circles, let alone in other capitals.

92. Id.

93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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It is unlikely though that it will supplant the ongoing debates
in the context of the WTO. At this point, it is probably fair to
say that the best hope for survival of the GCI is that does not
come to be seen as a crass or undignified attempt to separate
foreign competition authorities from their trade counterparts,
or a cynical attempt to hijack or derail the current discussions
in Geneva. However, therein lies the problem. To the extent
that a second parallel track is opened, pressure will be on to
explain why the second track could not be better achieved
within the WTO, UNCTAD or some expanded OECD.

F. Canada
The Canadian approach is more enigmatic. Like the EU,
Canada is supportive of multilateral rules, however, there are
indications that Canada is more skeptical about dispute settlement. Specifically, Canada has called for negotiations that
build upon the OECD.work such as the HCC Recommendation;9" the 1998 CLP Framework for Pre-merger Notification;97 and ongoing work on rights to remedy and positive comity. To this list, Canada has emphasized the need to establish a common approach to abuse of dominance, core principles,
and the elements of a minimum competition law institutional
framework (e.g. independent investigative agency, independent
judicial review/appeal and fair adjudication). 98 Canada has
proposed an agreement of this kind in the form of a
plurilateral agreement with a dispute settlement designed to
ensure that Members implement their minimum commitments
in accordance with their jurisprudence and legal traditions. 99
However, like the EU, the Canadians suggest rather unconvincingly that this could be done in a way that does not question how countries apply their laws in particular cases."0 A

96. HCC Recommendation, COM(98)7/FINAL at art. 2, para. 2.
97. Cooperation Recommendation, COM(95)130IFINAL at art. 3, para. 1.
98. Canada, Competition Policy and the International Trade Agenda, Discussion Paper (March 1999) [hereinafter Canada Discussion Paper].
99. Id.
100. Konrad Von Finkenstein, Commissioner of Competition, Speech to the

International Competition Policy Advisory Committee to the Attorney General,
Washington, D.C., (Nov. 2, 1998); Cf, Patricia Smith, Deputy Commissioner of

Competition, Economics and International Affairs Branch, Competition Bureau,
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consultation Discussion Paper described the Canadian position
as favoring:
[a] multilateral agreement on competition policy [which]
could include a commitment to fundamental principles such
as transparency and non-discrimination; common substantive
approaches to address private anti-competitive practices (including hard core cartels, abuse of dominance, merger review); mechanisms to enhance cooperation among countries;
as well as dispute settlement provisions. Provisions to encourage effective domestic enforcement of competition laws
could also be considered. In addition to facilitating cooperation between parties in addressing anti-competitive
behaviour, such an agreement could assist in providing firms
with needed assurance as to the rules of business conduct in
foreign markets and in ensuring they are treated in a nondiscriminatory way."

Remarks to a Symposium at the University of Toronto, (May 1999):
Some may argue that the workings of the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism under these circumstances would not significantly differ
from work currently being done in regard to other WTO obligations.
But this needs to be scrutinized much more closely, our concern is
that it might be difficult if not impossible to confine the dispute
settlement procedures to only these issues and that, inevitably, dispute settlement would lead to the review of decisions of competition
authorities in individual cases. The competition bureau has concerns
about the applicability of the existing WTO dispute settlement procedures to competition policy cases. the WTO has no mechanism to
deal with the intense fact finding investigation that is fundamental
to the economic analysis of competition cases, let alone a proven
track record on confidentiality matters. As you can no doubt gather
from this and reading between the lines in the paper, we strongly
question whether it's full speed ahead on this one! Nevertheless, we
believe a lot can be accomplished short of a dispute settlement mechanism. Before we start down the slippery slope of dispute settlement,
WTO members may wish to examine other means of reviewing
members' records in implementing their competition policy obligations.
Ms. Smith further advocated the creation of a Competition Policy Review Mechanism, and Trade-Related Aspects of Anticompetitive Measures Council to conduct
such reviews in lieu of a dispute settlement forum within the WTO.
101. Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 86.
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G. Japan
As for the last of the Quad countries, 11 2 Japan has tended to align itself with certain other developing countries, mostly from the Asia-Pacific region, in stressing the need to look at
the anticompetitive effects of trade remedies. Japan is more
vocal in its support of the EU initiative for multilateral investment rule-making in the context of the WTO, and there may
be a certain implied linkage to the EU competition as well. The
proposed Japanese framework would include the following elements:
a. Certain basic principles that all rules of the framework
should meet, including a "most-favoured-nation treatment",
"national treatment", "transparency" and "competition-oriented principle."1"
b. Priorities of anti-competitive practices to be banned (i.e.
hard core cartels; horizontal concerted boycotts; and import
cartels) and abuse of dominance."°
c. Common
procedures for review and analysis of merg5
ers. 0
d. linimization of exemptions and exceptions from national
competition laws.106
e. Effective national enforcement structures."°
f. Cooperation, notification and exchange of information and
conflict avoidance.'"
g. Dispute settlement procedures applied to: (i) failure to
adopt domestic legislation in conformity with obligations
stipulated in the framework; (ii) measures that directly vio-

102. See Hisamitsu Arai, Vice-Minister for International Affairs, MITI, Address
at Columbia University's Conference on The Next Trade Negotiating Round: Examining the Agenda for Seattle (July 22-23, 1999). In particular, note his remarks
with respect to the application of dispute settlement to individual cases suggesting

that, "even under existing WTO Rules, a similar problem could arise in the case
of a dispute relating to ..

. under the TRIPS Agreement." Id.

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Arai, supra note 90.
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late the framework (e.g. expansion of exemption systems);
and (iii)
inappropriate actions or tolerances against specific
09
cases.

H. The Developing Countries
As for developing countries, there does not appear to a
groundswell of interest in either the EU proposals for investment or competition rule-making of a horizontal nature. In
fact, the compromise between developed and developing countries is implicit in the narrow TRIMs Agreement,"0 and the
explicit linkage between trade and competition in the Singapore Declaration". remains relatively unchanged. To this
point, developing countries have not made clear exactly what
they are looking for in terms of the competition link to investment, although this may become clearer as UNCTAD's work
(begun in June 1999) on the latest Revision to the Set of Mutually Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices Progresses." One thing that
is clear is that developing country views are unlikely to be homogenous on these issues. However, there likely will be sufficient opposition, combined with divisions within, which means
that, as a practical matter, successfully achieving horizontal
competition policy rule-making will be very difficult.

III. SEATTLE AND ITS AFTERMATH
It is well known that the Seattle Ministerial meeting was
not an undiluted success. The talks, which lasted from November 30th until the early morning hours of December 4th, did
not result in the launching of a new round of trade negotia-

109. WTO, Working Group on the Interaction of Trade and Competition Policies
Communication from Japan WT/WGTCP/W/134 (July 14, 1999); WTO, Working
Group on the Interaction of Trade and Competition Policies Communication from
Japan WT/WGTCPIW/119 (May 27, 1999).
110. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 34.
111. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, supra note 38.
112. United Nations Conference of Trade and Development, Agreed Conclusions
of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy at its
Second Session, U.N. Doc. TD/B/COM.2/CLP/L.5 (1999).
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tions. Instead, the talks were suspended. Several points need
to be made about this.
First, neither competition law nor investment law were
the determining factors leading to the suspension of the talks.
Rather, issues of process and transparency, labor, and agriculture appeared to be the most significant sources of disagreement. A text"3 was floated by the Chairs of both the WGTCP
and the WGTI that survived into the frozen negotiation text
dated December 3, 1999. That is not to say that the text represented a consensus, but rather that more progress was made
in this area than in many other areas. This might imply that if
further significant progress can be made on the major stumbling blocks in Seattle, then both trade and investment will be
addressed more easily than might otherwise be apparent. This
is, of course, dependent upon opinions not hardening on these
issues during the suspension.
Second, while the Seattle Ministerial meeting remains suspended, progress has been made toward starting a negotiation
based on the "built in agenda" from the Uruguay Round in
agriculture and services."" Additionally, there are indications
that both the EU and the U.S. are working on developing a
package of market access concessions for least-developed countries and steps to make the World Trade Organization more
accessible to non-governmental groups." 5 This progress demonstrates a desire to fill the vacuum left from Seattle. This
bodes well for an eventual launching of a round of negotiations
at some point in the future. In this regard, it is useful to recall
that the launching of the ambitious Uruguay Round also had
an uneven beginning, but in the end, the new issues of services, trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights and to a
lesser extent, trade-related investment measures were added
successfully to the negotiations.'16

113. See WTO, supra note 97.
114. WTO Puts Off Implementation Decisions; Launches Agenda, Services Talks,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 11, 2000, at 3.
115. U.S., EU To Work Out WTO Market Access, Implementation Package, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 25, 2000, at 12.
116. See generally JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: A
HISTORY OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1995).
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A. Before Seattle
I want to turn to examine the two texts that were on the
table in the letter from the Chairman of the General Council,
Ambassador Ali Said Mchumo, to all WTO Members and Observer Governments dated November 19, 1999. One version
provided that:
42. Negotiations in this area shall aim to enhance the contribution of competition law and policy to international trade
and development, including by strengthening the capacity of
all participants to address anti-competitive business practices
distorting or impeding international trade and investment,
and in order better to ensure that the benefits of trade and
investment liberalization are realized and shared by all citizens. To this end, a multilateral framework shall be developed that would enable the following to be addressed:
(a) core principles of competition law and policy, building
in particular on the WTO principles of transparency and nondiscrimination;
(b) the development of common approaches to anti-competitive practices, while respecting the diversity of national
laws and situations;
(c) appropriate modalities and support mechanisms,
including sufficient resources, for case-specific, technical and
other forms of cooperation among WTO Members, including
the exchange of information between relevant authorities;
(d) the particular needs and situations of developingcountry participants, including by providing for special and
differential treatment.
The framework to be developed shall not provide for the
WTO dispute settlement system to be used to review national
decisions in individual competition cases. [Provision shall
also be made for an examination and possible reform of existing WTO rules from a competition policy perspective.]
43. [Prior to the substantive negotiating phase, an intensive
educative and analytical process of up to two years will be
undertaken, in order to enable all participants to be adequately prepared for negotiations and to have assessed the
possible outcomes and implications.] In order to facilitate the
full participation of developing and least-developed country
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participants in these negotiations, adequate resources shall
be made available for technical cooperation and capacitybuilding, not only in regard to the establishment and reinforcement of competition policies, laws and institutions but
also in regard to issues under negotiation, including through
the organization of regional seminars. In this connection, the
WTO Secretariat will seek the cooperation of UNCTAD, the
World117Bank and other relevant intergovernmental organizations.
The alternative proposal provided that:
57. The Working Group on the Interaction between Trade
and Competition Policy shall pursue its present mandate
building on the work undertaken to date [and shall present
its findings and recommendations on a possible multilateral
framework to the Fourth Session]. [The work should focus on
the implications for developing countries of the proposals
submitted on this subject, in particular in regard to actions to
combat anti-competitive practices of firms and to the need for
monitoring and reviewing mergers and take-overs which have
an impact on international competition. Provision shall also
be made for a review of existing WTO rules from a competition policy perspective. Adequate technical cooperation, in
cooperation, where appropriate, with other intergovernmental
organizations,
will be made available to facilitate the above
118
work.]
It can be seen that, going into Seattle, there was no consensus on whether a negotiation on competition policy should
be initiated (and if so, what should be included in it) or whether the educational work of the WGTCP should continue. Paragraph 57 represents what has become known as the "South
African" proposal, namely pre-negotiation educational work
followed by a decision on a negotiation at a subsequent
point.119

117. Preparationsfor The 3rd Session of the Ministerial Conference: Letter from
the Chairman of the General Council, Ambassador Ali Said Mchumo, to all WTO
Members and Observer Governments, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 19, 1999, at 7.
118. Id.
119. WTO, Communication from South Africa, WT/WGTCP/W/138 (Oct. 11,
1999).
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B. Seattle
As of December 3, 1999, the operative text that was under
discussion, though by no means a consensus text at that point
provided that:
41. Building on the work done on the interaction between
trade and competition policy, we agree to continue the educational and analytical work, based on proposals by Members.
The issues on which this work shall focus shall include core
principles of competition policy and of the WTO, approaches
to anti-competitive practices of enterprises, appropriate modalities and support mechanisms for exchange of experience
and other forms of cooperation, and measures to address the
particular needs and situations of developing countries.
42. This work shall be purposeful and focused, and aim to
assist all Members to prepare for, and adequately assess the
possible implications of, negotiations on this issue.
A report on this work shall be presented to the Fourth
Ministerial Conference, which shall decide whether specific
guidance is needed for any negotiation to be launched at that
time under the single undertaking.12
This text represents something of a compromise between
the two pre-Seattle alternatives. The text goes some ways
towards enumerating the nature of the work to be addressed
by the WGTCP, but neither provides for a negotiation nor rules
one out at a later date. It is difficult to measure how much
support existed for this proposal in Seattle. United States
Trade Representative, Charlene Barchefsky, summed up the
situation this way:
In particular, efforts to launch negotiations will falter again
if the EU insists on negotiations on investment and competition rules for which there had been no support among members. It was clear in the smaller Green Room meetings at
Seattle that full scale negotiations on investment, competition policy, government procurement and possibly other areas

120. Draft Ministerial Declaration As Discussed in Green Room Dec., INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, December 10, 1999, at 10.
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are not
supported by the 'vast, vast, vast majority' of mem12 1
bers.

C. After Seattle
In the wake of the Seattle meeting, the EU and Japan
reiterated their desire for "the improvement and reinforcement
of existing rules and disciplines such as anti-dumping, as well
as the establishment of additional rules for investment, [and]
competition ... ."12' However, there are also signs that the
internal EU consensus on competition rule-making may be beginning to break down. 1" Nonetheless, the recent Communication from the EC to the EU's "Committee 113" (the committee of EU Member states that determines EU policy) continues
to emphasize competition rule-making. It states that:
[Tihe WTO also needs to update its rules to respond to the
effects of globalisation, so that our traders and investors can
enjoy a predictable, transparent and non-discriminatory
framework in which to make their economic decisions and to
compete. Basic rules on investment and competition are necessarily part of such an agenda and will go some way towards providing this environment. There continues to be
solid support from a large group of "Friends" of a new round
for the inclusion of these issues in a negotiation, and it is a
matter of regret that negotiations on two subjects of such
systemic importance and of benefit to companies around the
world could not be launched.IM
Remarkably, a competition negotiation does not figure directly
into the enumerated strategy of the EC to re-launch a round of
trade negotiations."

121. Barshefsky Urges EU To Scale Back Agenda For WTO Round, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Dec. 24, 1999, at 3.
122. EU-Japan Joint Statement on the WTO, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 14, 2000,
at 2.
123. UK Seeks Ministerial Meeting in New Year to Review WTO Processes, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Dec. 24, 2000, at 4.
124. EU Commission Memo on WTO Strategy, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 18,
2000, at 25.
125. Id.
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Having said that, it is significant that the WTO General
Council decided on February 8, 2000 to reappoint the current
Chairs of the WGTCP and WGTI. 126 By informal agreement,
it was subsequently decided on March 27, 2000 that the
WGTCP would hold two formal meetings in 2000 and will
pursue work in accordance with its existing mandate. On the
other hand, at the time of the writing of this article, no decision has been made on extending the time-limit on article 9 of
the TRIMS Agreement 12 which called for a decision to be
made on whether to pursue rule-making with respect to investment and competition." That time limit expired earlier this
year, by the terms of article 9 five years after the TRIMs
Agreement came into effect on January 1, 1995.129

IV. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions from what is
essentially a work in progress. In this section, I have tried to
give a static view into the dynamics of a negotiation that is
ongoing. On balance, I tend to think that something close to
the December 3, 2000 formulation will*carry the day if the
larger issues surrounding a negotiation - transparency, labor,
environment, agriculture, and bio-technology - can be addressed within the political calendars that are operating on
both sides of the Atlantic. In other words, the basis of an
agreement between the U.S., the EU and Japan seems apparent enough: continued education and a deferral of a decision
with respect to a negotiation. What remains unclear is how
developing countries will come out on this issue. However, as
this formulation is, in essence, the South African formulation,
it is hard to see what developing countries lose on the margins
by going along with it if their more fundamental concerns are
addressed elsewhere.
In the next section of the paper, I discuss how competition

126. Press Release, WTO, WTO Chairs for 2000 (Feb. 8, 2000) (on file with the
author).
127. WTO Holds Off on Ways to Deal With Extensions of TRIMS Deadline,
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Jan. 28, 2000, at 4.

128. Id.
129. Id.
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rule-making can enter into the next round of negotiations as
part of the "built-in agenda" on trade in services.

V. TRADE AND COMPETITION POLICY RULE-MAKING: SERVICES A POINT OF DEPARTURE
Aside from the practical difficulties of achieving such a
multilateral competition law and policy agreement, there is the
further question of the desirability of such an agreement for
the liberalization of trade in services. In a Canadian public
consultation Discussion Paper, certain market access barriers
to trade in services were identified:
Example of barriers to market access are: limitations on the
numbers of service suppliers (i.e., in the form of quotas, monopolies, rights for exclusive supply); limitations on the total
number of services transactions or assets or operations (i.e.,
usually expressed in terms of a quota); limitations on the
total number of persons that may be employed in a particular
service sector; measures which restrict the legal entity
through which a foreign service supplier may deliver the
service (e.g., subsidiaries, branches, joint ventures) - and
limitations on the level of shareholding or investment that a
foreign service supplier may make.3 0
This is a useful point of departure because it identifies
monopolies, quotas, and rights of exclusive supply as key problems. Competition law, particularly if applied to public sector
firms, other state-owned enterprises, and firms operating with
exclusive and special rights, could potentially be quite helpful
in addressing these problems. Further examples of
anticompetitive practices that could potentially create market
problems for service suppliers can be found in the 1999 USTR
Report on Foreign Trade Barriers.' For instance, that Report lists certain computer airline reservation system practices
of dominant EU firms that may have the effect of adversely affecting the ability of U.S. airline firms to compete in certain

130. Canada, Services Issues Paper (March 1999).
131. United States Trade Representative, 1999 Report to the President on Foreign Trade Barriers, at 131 (1999).
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markets.'3 2 Interestingly, this case was the subject of the
first, and so far, only formal positive comity request under the
U.S.-E.C. Cooperation Agreement.' After almost one year,
the case against one of the owners of the reservation system
was settled, and the EC filed a Statement of Objections against
the practices of the other owner of the system. That part of the
case continues, but the example illustrates the link between
anticompetitive practices and trade in services. Other potential
examples include airport ground handling services reserved to
national carriers. In this specific case, the EC has issued a Directive phasing out that practice. The point to be made is that
in sectors such as energy, postal services, telecommunications,
and others where exclusive rights remain, some multilateral
agreement on competition policy could be beneficial in securing
market access.
At this point, it is worthwhile to list a few other potential
anticompetitive measures, and the potential sectors in which
they might arise: abuse of dominance (financial and postal
services, transportation, energy); price fixing (shipping, airlines; professional services); bid-rigging (infrastructure, construction); state aids (airlines); as well as a VER-like market
access-inhibiting exceptions/carve-outs from national competition laws. I will return to a sectoral analysis below.
With respect to sectors covered in a Member's schedule,
GATS article 8 requires the Member to ensure that a monopoly
supplier does not "abuse its monopoly position""4 when it
competes in the supply of services outside its monopoly rights.
Article 9:1 provides that "Members recognize that certain business practices of service providers, other than those falling
under article 8, may restrain competition and thereby restrict
trade in services." Article 9:2 obliges Members to accede to any
request for consultation with any other Member concerning
such practices "with a view to eliminating" them."' It also
imposes a duty to cooperate in the provision of non-confidential

132. Id.
133. Hearing on International Antitrust Enforcement Before the Sen. Comm. on
the Judiciary Subcomm. on Antitrust, Bus. Rights, and Competition (Statement of
Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division U.S. Dep't Of Just.
(May 4, 1999).
134. GATS, supra note 2, at art. 8, para. 2.
135. GATS, supra note 2, at art. 9, para. 2.
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information of relevance to the matter in question.
To date, there only has been one request for consultations
concerning GATS article VIII. That case involves a United
States complaint that Belgian law and regulations on the reform of public enterprises imposes conditions for obtaining a
license to publish commercial directories in Belgium, and measures governing the acts, policies, and practices of Belgacomm
N.V. with respect to telephone directory services, contravene
inter alia GATS article VIII."' Belgacomm, the former telephone monopolist in Belgium, is 51% owned by the Belgian
government (with the other 49% held by Ameritech, Tele
Dannmark, and Singapore Telacomm)" 7 and is responsible to
the Ministry of Telecommunications, which supervises the
Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications.1 38
Interestingly, the United States did not request consultations with the EC at the same time it made the request to Belgium. There appears to be some suggestion that Belgacomm's
actions may also be under investigation by the EC for violating
an EC Directive.'39 This is a good example of the potential for
competition policy to be used for further liberalization in trade
in services, and to address market access barriers. The fact
that the United States has complained raises the interesting
possibility that while some potential U.S. entrant is being hurt
by the alleged infringement, a U.S. firm, in this case, the "Baby Bell", Ameritech, is also benefitting from the alleged practice. What is clear is that consumers in Belgium are probably
being hurt by facing higher prices or reduced choice. Competition policy, therefore, may be a useful complement to services
liberalization because its tradition of non-discriminatory application of certain principles can benefit both domestic consumers and potential foreign entrants with market access concerns.
We are still in the very early day of GATS articles VIII
Affecting
Commercial
Directory
Services,
136. See
Belgium-Measures
WT/DS80/1, at http'J/www.wto.org/search97cgi/s97.htm (last visited May 12, 1997)
[hereinafter Belgian Measures].
137. Ameritech, a U.S. firm, also owns 42% of Tele Dannmark.
138. See Belgian Measures, supra note 124.
139. See Gary N. Horlick, The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution:
A Private Practitioner'sView, 32 INT'L LAW 685 at n.25 (Fall 1998). See generally
EC Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions - Fourth Report on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package,
COM(98)594/FINAL.
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and IX, but this case shows, to some extent, the potential of
the GATS to apply competition principles to address certain
anticompetitive practices. Thus the GATS itself, apart from the
much more talked about sectoral context, is already equipped
with certain limited competition principles. This has been
recognized in the OECD horizontal work on regulatory reform
where one of six "efficient regulation principles for market
openness" " recognizes the need for competition principles to
realize and maintain benefits of reform.' These competition
principles are based substantially on GATS articles VIII and
IX
This discussion, and the earlier discussion of potential
sectors posing anticompetitive problems, suggests that in
thinking about making the GATS an even more promising tool
for achieving liberalization, perhaps some thought should be
given to making articles VIII and IX even more powerful, directly or through some reconsidered notion of GATS article VI
on domestic regulation. I will return to this theme below.143

A. The Telecommunications Sector
The negotiations on basic telecommunications were not
completed by the time the Uruguay Round drew to a close in
December 1993. It had become apparent, as the Uruguay
Round negotiations on services proceeded, that governments
saw telecommunications as special because of their importance
in the supply of many other services. Without access to telecom
services, many other services cannot be delivered, making
specific commitments in relation to the latter of dubious value.
Thus, paragraph 5(a) of the Annex states that: "[elach Member
shall ensure that any service supplier of any other Member is
accorded access to and use of public telecommunications trans-

140. See OECD, The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform, Volume II: Thematic
Studies at 316 (1997), at http'//www.oecd.org/subjectlregreform/report/htm [hereinafter Report on Regulatory Reform]; Trade and Regulatory Reform: Implications of
the OECD Country Reviews for Future Rule-making, OECD TD/TC/WP(99)16 at 59. The other five principles are: transparency; non-discrimination; least trade restrictiveness; use of harmonized measures; and mutual recognition of the equivalence of regulatory measures. Id.
141. Id.
142. Report on Regulatory Reform, supra note 128, at 316.
143. See discussion, infra Part VI.
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port networks and services on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms and conditions for the supply of a service included
in its Schedule."4 4
Suppliers of such services are entitled to access to and use
of any public telecommunications transport network or service
offered within or across the border. This includes private
leased circuits, the right to purchase or lease, to attach terminal or other equipment to the network, and to interconnect
private leased or owned circuits with public telecommunications transport networks and services (or circuits leased or
owned by another service supplier). " 5 These rights are qualified by the right of the entity owning and/or controlling the
network to impose conditions on access and use in order to
safeguard public service responsibilities, protect the technical
integrity of the networks or services, and to restrict network
use where this is not required pursuant to a scheduled commitment.'46 The obligations of the Annex extend not only to service suppliers in other sectors, but also to those in the telecommunications sector who would compete with incumbent network operators. " 7
Thus to a degree, competition policy-related issues concerning interconnection, market conduct safeguards, and transparency had already been touched upon in the GATS and its
associated Annex on Telecommunications. However, some
negotiators felt that the Annex commitments were too general
to guarantee new entrants adequate opportunity to compete.
The obligations of GATS and the Annex on Telecommunications apply only to those telecommunications sectors that the
WTO Members incorporated in their Schedules. Mostly, the
Schedules contained what is commonly referred to as "enhanced telecommunications services. " "' Enhanced services
are those services in which the voice or nonvoice information

144. See Annex, supra note 1.
Non-discrimination in this context comprises
both MFN and national treatment. Id.
145. Id. at para. 5(b)i-iii.
146. Id. at pars. 5(e)i-iii.
147. It should be noted that Annex commitments only apply in those sectors
where governments have accepted specific market access and national treatment
commitments. Under the GATS, governments have negotiated these commitments
on a sector-by-sector basis, and in sectors that are not covered in this manner, the
only obligations that apply relate to most-favoured-nation treatment and transparency.
148. Annex, supra note 1.
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being transferred from one point to another undergoes an endto-end restructuring or format change before it reaches the
customer.'
In 1994, the Members' Schedules generally included enhanced services, such as electronic mail, voice mail,
on-line information, electronic data interchange, value-added
facsimile services, code and protocol conversion, and data processing. 50
The Members were not ready in 1994 to make commitments on "basic telecommunications services" because, unlike
enhanced services, the supply of basic services has been by
state-owned operators or state-sanctioned monopolies.' 5 '
Thus, it became increasingly apparent that if negotiations were
limited to the traditional trade approach of scheduling commitments on market access and national treatment, there would
not be a guarantee that liberalization commitments would
translate into effective access to markets.'5 2 The removal of
regulatory entry barriers is clearly a necessary condition of
access, but such action would have little impact in the face of
non-governmental barriers based on the ability of regulated
incumbent firms to frustrate the market entry.
Thus, a significant component of the extended negotiations
centered around a quest for a set of acceptable regulatory principles that would be enforceable through WTO dispute settlement procedures. Accordingly, proposals were made to define
interconnection rights more specifically. Market conduct safeguards were also sought to ensure that suppliers with market
power refrain from a range of anti-competitive practices. Finally, transparency requirements were sought in order to ensure
the countries had adopted it. I turn next to a consideration of
the Reference Paper.

B. The Reference Paper
The Reference Paper to the GATS Agreement on Basic

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Patrick Low, Multilateral Rules on Competition: What Can We Learn From
the Telecommunications Sector?, Address at OECD Workshop on Trade Policy for a
Globalizing Economy (Nov. 1995).
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Telecommunications Agreement ("Reference Paper")153 represents a prominent example of a framework in a WTO agreement that already involves competition principles. Specifically,
the Reference Paper contains a general commitment of Members to maintain appropriate measures to prevent suppliers
unilaterally, or collectively, from engaging in or continuing
anti-competitive practices. A "major supplier" is defined as one
with the power "to materially affect the terms of participation
(having regard to price and supply), either due to control
over
154
position."
market
its
or
facilities
network
essential
In addition, the Reference Paper gives several specific
examples of anti-competitive practices. These are:
a. anti-competitive cross-subsidization;
b. use of information obtained from competitors (with "anticompetitive results");
c. withholding technical and commercially relevant information.155
The Reference Paper also applies to "interconnection"
issues: e.g. the linking with suppliers providing public telecommunications transport networks or services to allow the users
of one supplier to communicate with users of another supplier
and to access services provided by another supplier.'56 However, the extent of this obligation is limited to the specific commitments undertaken by a Member in the various schedules of
GATS and ABT commitments. Interconnection must be provided:
a. under non-discriminatory terms, conditions (including
technical standards and specifications) and rates and of a
quality no less favorable than that provided for its own like
services or for like services of non-affiliated service suppliers
or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;
b. in a timely fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and specifications), and cost-oriented rates that

153. Reference Paper, 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997) [hereinafter Reference Paper].
154. Id.

155. Id. at § 1.2.
156. Id. at § 2.
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are transparent, reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently unbundled so that the supplier need
not pay for network components or facilities that it does not
require for the service to be provided; and
c. upon request, at points in addition to the network termination points offered to the majority of users, subject to
charges that reflect the cost of construction of necessary additional facilities."'
The Reference Paper also builds on transparency in order
to ensure that the Agreement can actually be operationalized.
The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier will be made publicly available, and a major supplier
must make publicly available either its interconnection agreements or a reference interconnection offer.
With respect to settlement of disputes under the Agreement, the Reference Paper appears to distinguish between
disputes about anti-competitive practices and disputes about
interconnection. There is no particular form of dispute settlement provided for disputes over anti-competitive practices of
major suppliers, however, presumably a Reference Paper
Signatory's failure to maintain appropriate measures would be
subject to dispute settlement. With respect to interconnection,
the Reference Paper indicates that for dispute settlement,
recourse is to be made to an independent domestic body. 55 A
service supplier requesting interconnection with a major supplier will have recourse, either: "at any time"159 or "after a
reasonable period of time which has been made publicly
known" to an independent domestic body, which may be a
regulatory body.6 ° That body must be given the authority to
resolve disputes regarding appropriate terms, conditions and
rates for interconnection within a reasonable period of time, to
the extent that these have not been established previously. It
is conceivable (and not precluded by the terms of the Reference

157. Id. at § 2.2.
158. Id. at § 2.5.
159. Id. at § 2.5(a).
160. In the case where this is a "regulatory body," it must be separate from,
and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications services, and its
decisions of and the procedures used by regulators must be impartial with respect
to all market participants. See Reference Paper, supra note 141, at § 2.5(b).
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Paper itself) that the body might not be a sector-specific regulator, but, e.g., a competition authority.'61
The Reference Paper also reflects a balance between the
objectives of both trade liberalization and competition policy
and other social or policy objectives of interest to governments
and civil society. Article 3 provides that any Member has the
right to define the kind of universal service obligation it wishes
to maintain, and such obligations will not be regarded as anticompetitive per se. However, those requirements must be administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory, and competitively neutral manner and cannot be more burdensome than
necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the Member. Similarly, any procedures for the allocation and use of
scarce resources, including frequencies, numbers, and rights of
way, must be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent
and non-discriminatory manner.
When the ABT entered into force in February 1998, 69 of
the 130 WTO members committed to some degree of
liberalization of their telecommunication markets.'62 Of
these, 44 (representing 99 percent of basic telecommunications
revenue among WTO members) permitted entry by foreign
carriers. 6 ' Furthermore, 55 countries agreed to adhere to the
Reference Paper.
C. Implications of the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications
In this section, I discuss the implications of the ABT for
future multilateral rule-making with respect to trade and competition policy issues. First, I identify several unique factors
that, in part, made possible this sectoral agreement. Second, I
discuss possible ways in which the architecture of this agree-

161. See generally Reference Paper, supra note 141.
162. See Toshiaki Takigawa, The Impact of the WTO Telecommunications Agreement on the U.S. and Japanese Telecommunications Regulations, 32 J. WORLD
TRADE 33, 39 (Dec. 1998).
163. See id. at 40.
164. See id. at 39-40. Cf Lawrence J. Spiwak, From International Competitive
Carrierto the WTO: A Survey of the FCC's International Telecommunications Policy Initiatives 1985-1998, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 111, 176 (1998) (noting that certain
"signatory countries agreed to uphold certain 'pro-competitive regulatory principles'
yet, at the same time, these signatory countries also condone those signatory countries which refuse to allow any new competitors to enter their market").
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ment may be applied in other sectoral contexts, or to other
multilateral rule making. Finally, I conclude with a discussion
of several normative caveats, which suggest that this model
should be invoked with some caution when it comes to other
contexts.
1. Factors Facilitating the ABT
First, over the last two decades, there has been a spurt in
technological developments in the telecommunications industry
globally.'65 These developments on the supply-side have been
matched with tremendous growth in demand for traditional
and new forms of telecommunication services.
Second, this growth in demand is linked, in part, to the
fact that telecommunication services are an important component of, or input into, traded or tradable services.' The demand and supply of enhanced services and growth of foreign
service suppliers in these areas have also tended to highlight
the further gains that could be achieved by liberalisation of
basic telecommunications services as well. Furthermore, as
barriers between nations decline, and economic interdependence grows, so too does the demand for increased links between national telecommunication networks. Consequently,
this interdependence highlighted the need for a multilateral as
opposed to a network of bilateral approaches. Furthermore,
given the prominence of this sector in the modern global economy, certain growth-oriented developing countries may have
chosen to signal their commitment to open trade and investment policies by agreeing to liberalization in this sector.'67
Third, over the same time period many of the leading
markets for the demand and supply of telecommunications
services have unilaterally liberalised their regulations of first,
enhanced telecommunication services, and then basic telecommunication services. This liberalisation has in some cases also
involved significant privatisation of incumbent domestic mo-

165. See generally OECD, Information Technology Outlook 1997 (1997); OECD
Communications Outlook 1997, Vol. 2 at 31 (1997).
166. Patrick Low & Aadityi Mattoo, Reform in Basic Telecommunications and
the WTO Negotiations: The Asian Experience, at http://www.wto.orgenglish/res_elreser..elpera9801.wpf (last visited Feb. 1998).
167. Id.
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nopolies. This trend has been accompanied by increasing application of competition principles by telecommunications regulators, or in some cases the application of competition policy to
these sectors.'6 8 There is wide agreement that this transitional nature of the telecommunications industry, from a highly
regulated character with public monopolies, to a less regulated
character with more entrants and service providers, was a
crucial and unique feature recognition of which helps to explain the competition provisions of the Reference Paper. Once
governments had decided to emphasize entry and to open this
network industry to international competition, there was a
feeling that traditional trade approaches to market access
through national treatment and MFN commitments alone
would not be sufficient to ensure successful entry by foreign
service suppliers without additional competitive safeguards.
Hence the Reference Paper builds on both traditional market
access concepts as well as competition principles. Although,
some might argue that, in this respect, the Reference Paper
could be seen as going beyond the existing approaches to access to "essential facilities" under the competition laws of
many countries.
Fourth, the successful negotiation of the ABT may have
something to do with the inherent character of trade in services as compared to trade in goods. It may be that trade in services is seen as inherently implicating "behind the border"
domestic regulation to a much greater degree than the traditional "at the border" tariff or non-tariff barriers emphasis of
the liberalization of trade in goods. Even where the national
treatment commitment applies behind the border to imported
"like" products, it is less likely to call into question the existing
domestic regulatory scheme and choices as appears to be the
case in trade in many services. Accordingly, nations have been
more hesitant to apply the broad traditional approach to applying the most-favoured-nation ("MFN") and national treatment principles than has been the case with trade in goods.
Therefore, from a pragmatic viewpoint, a negotiating approach based on a degree of up front liberalisation, and disciplines on domestic regulation may have been important. It

168. See generally OECD, Competition in Telecommunications OCDE/GD(96)114;
see also OECD,Developments In Telecommunications: An Update Aide Memoire, at
http://www.oecd.orgt/daf/clp/roundtables/tel-aidmm.htm (last visited Jan. 1998).
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may be that, for this reason, trade liberalisation and competition law and policy can act in a particularly focused and complementary fashion to promote pro-competitive reform of existing domestic regulation. While competition authorities will be
concerned with promoting competition within the domestic
market, trade officials will also be concerned with the relationship between the domestic market regulation, and export and
foreign investment opportunities of domestic firms.
These four factors may not be necessary, but rather sufficient conditions for trade and competition policy to work in a
complementary fashion in respect of multilateral rule making.
Accordingly, one might suggest that other highly regulated
tradable service sectors characterised by network effects (e.g.
electricity) may be candidates for the ABT approach to multilateral rule making. I will return to this point below.
2. Architecture
Although the ABT is a sectoral agreement with respect to
trade in services, its architecture might have implications for
both trade in goods, and more general multilateral competition
rule making. As discussed above, the ABT builds on the GATS
commitment of: MFN and national treatment linked to schedules of commitments; transparency; disciplines on the abuse of
a monopoly position by a monopoly supplier; and multilateral
dispute settlement. In addition the ABT incorporates the Telecommunications Annex to the GATS which addresses issues of
access and use of public telecommunications transport networks and services. 69 Similarly, the ABT incorporates the
Reference Paper; at least insofar as concerns the 55 countries
that have agreed to adhere to it." 6 The Reference Paper also
addresses
issues of anticompetitive practices and interconnec7
tion.'

1

It may be worth giving further consideration to this aspect
of the Reference Paper. As discussed above, the Reference
Paper defines a "major supplier" as a supplier that has a mate-

169. See generally Annex, supra note 1, at 1194.
170. Takigawa, supra note 150, at 40.
171. Reference Paper, supra note 141, at § 1.1, para. 2.
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rial effect on price or quantity by virtue of controlling an essential facility or using its market position.'72 No further definition is given of the term "essential facility" suggesting that
each jurisdiction has, at least, some degree of regulatory flexibility. With respect to the major supplier's abuse of its market
position, more guidance is given by a non-exhaustive list of
anticompetitive practices - cross-subsidization; the misuse of
competitors' confidential information (presumably obtained
from interconnection or through horizontal collusion); and
withholding important information relating to an essential
facility. In the context of the application of competition policy
in most OECD Members, at least as regards telecommunications, this list is probably uncontroversial insofar as it goes.
However, what is important here is that Members have agreed
to a framework for thinking about anticompetitive practices in
the telecommunications area while retaining important degrees
of freedom to implement their regulatory policy choices. This
point holds true even with respect to interconnection issues
discussed in the Reference Paper. Again, if there were a failure
to meet this obligation permanently this would likely be a
matter for multilateral dispute settlement.
Thus, the Reference Paper provides a flexible approach to
dealing with certain trade and competition concerns. This
flexible architecture is also manifested in the dispute settlement provisions of the Reference Paper. Countries have an
obligation to maintain "appropriate measures" to prevent major suppliers from engaging or continuing to engage in
anticompetitive practices. There is no obligation with respect to
the detailed application of those laws. However, the WTO dispute settlement provisions could address the issue of whether
a particular measure is "appropriate" without making a judgement about the application of the measure in any particular
case. With respect to interconnection issues, countries are
required to provide access to an independent "regulator," and
such regulator is subject to certain other procedural requirements.

172. Id. at 367.
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3. Caveats

Three important caveats about the ABT model of dealing
with trade and competition concerns can be identified at this
stage. First, it might be argued that if governments agree to
create mutual obligations to enforce a given set of regulatory
principles, they could be viewed as having tied themselves into
an established pattern of regulation. This approach may be
appealing from the point of view of opening up market access
on a broadly reciprocal basis. However, it also has the potential drawback of locking in a uniform approach in circumstances that might be quite different among countries. In the specific context of the ABT and the Reference Paper, and the more
general context of possible future multilateral initiatives that
might build upon the flexible architecture described above, this
will not necessarily be the case. That is so because the Reference Paper does not set forth a detailed or mechanical "common standard" for regulation of the telecommunications sector.
Rather, the Reference Paper provides an approach to applying
principles of competition to the telecommunications sector
while leaving significant freedom and flexibility for Members
to implement their regulatory policy choices.
This problem, to the extent that it exists, can also be addressed through the design of the regulatory principles that do
not apply when a given threshold of diversification in relation
to the sources of supply available in a market has been attained. Even so, multilateral uniformity may still in some
circumstances lead to a suboptimal degree of regulatory intervention. In other words, the regulatory authorities, or the
governments, to whom they are ultimately responsible, could
find that multilateral commitments make regulatory forbearance harder in circumstances where it might otherwise seem
desirable. Again, for the reasons described above, in the specific context of the ABT and the Reference Paper, and the more
general context of possible future multilateral initiatives that
might build upon its flexible architecture, there is no a priori
reason to expect this result to occur.
The third caveat is the risk that regulatory interventions
putatively designed to promote competition instead become
primarily used to protect competitors, not competition. However, given the flexible architecture of the ABT and the Reference
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Paper, there does not appear to be any a priori reason to expect the problem of rent-seeking to be worsened by the multilateral agreement. On the contrary, the embodied emerging
consensus among trade and competition officials about telecommunications regulation would seem to strengthen, rather than
weaken the hands of those authorities wrestling with these
forms of rent seeking behaviour. It must also be recognized
that antitrust laws and their enforcement may, in certain
jurisdictions - inside and outside the OECD - reflect multiple
objectives, including industrial policy considerations. It is also
true that antitrust authorities may be subject to the similar
problems of capture and political influence as other types of
regulators.
This section of the paper has attempted to set forth some
of the implications of the ABT for multilateral rule making in
respect of trade and competition policy issues, while recognizing that there are discrete factors that led to the creation of
what one commentator has called "a unique and slightly divergent method for the establishment of international competition."7 ' Where similar conditions are present, the ABT might
provide a useful model for dealing with these issues in other
sectors such as electricity.
The next section of the paper looks at the other GATS
sectoral "agreement" that refers to competition policy - Financial Services.

D. The Understandingon FinancialServices
The Understanding on Financial Services ("Understanding") is similar to the Reference Paper to the Basic Telecommunications Agreement. It has no independent status as a
WTO or GATS Agreement per se, except to the extent that it
has been reproduced into Members Schedules of Specific Commitments as provided for in the Annex on Financial Services to
the GATS.
The Understanding makes certain market access provi-

173. James F. Rill et al., Institutional Responsibilities Affecting Competition in
the Telecommunications Industry: A PracticingLawyer's Perspective, Working Draft
Paper, prepared for the European University Institute 1998 EU Competition Workshop, at 23 (1998).
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sions with respect to monopoly rights. It provides that in addition to Article VIII of the GATS "[elach Member shall list in its
schedule pertaining to financial services existing monopoly
1 4
rights and shall endeavour to eliminate or reduce them." 1
Furthermore, this additional commitment applies to other
activities conducted by a public entity for the account or with
the guarantee of using the financial resources of the Government.

E. Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy
Sector
The WTO Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector (the "Accounting Disciplines") were adopted
by the Council on Trade in Services in December 1998. Unlike
the Reference Paper or the Financial Services Understanding,
the Accounting Disciplines have not yet been incorporated into
any country's Schedule of Commitments. The Working Party
on Professional Services continues to aim to develop general
disciplines for professional services, while retaining the possibility to develop or revise sectoral disciplines, including accountancy. No later than the conclusion of the forthcoming round of
services negotiations, the disciplines developed by the WPPS
are intended to be integrated into the GATS. Until the formal
integration of these disciplines into the GATS, Members are
enjoined, to the fullest extent consistent with their existing
legislation, not to take measures which would be inconsistent
with these disciplines.' As such, their status at present represents that of hortatory guidelines.'
As such, they do not
appear to be subject to the dispute settlement provisions of the
WTO. This architecture may serve as a useful precedent in the
event that the OECD non-binding Recommendations approach

174. The Understanding on Financial Services, art. B(1), at http:/www.wto.org/english/docse/legal_e/final-e.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2000). Legitimate objectives are defined in Article IH:2 as, inter alia, the protection of consumers (which
includes all users of accounting services and the public generally), the quality of
the service, professional competence, and the integrity of the profession.
175. WTO, Report to the Council for Trade in Services on the Development of
Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy Sector, S/WPPS/4, (Dec. 10,
1998).
176. Id. at attach. 1, para. 3.
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to international competition policy rule-making were adopted
within the WTO.
In addition to that architectural point, the Accounting
Disciplines do contain provisions on licensing that are similar
to concerns of competition policy enforcers.'77 For instance,
they provide that where membership of a professional organization is required, in order to fulfil a legitimate objective specified in the text, Members shall ensure that the terms for membership are reasonable, and do not include conditions or preconditions unrelated to the fulfillment of such an objective.'7 8
Furthermore, where membership of a professional organization
is required as a prior condition for application for a license (i.e.
an authorization to practice), the period of membership imposed before the application may be submitted shall be kept to
a minimum.179 Both of these conditions focus on reducing
barriers to entry which could pose both market access and
competition problems. 8 '
In addition, the market access provisions prohibit, in sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, a
Member from maintaining or adopting either on the basis of a
regional subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its Schedule, limitations on the
number of service suppliers whether in the form of numerical
quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an economic needs test.'
This section of the paper has reviewed the competition
provisions in the GATS and its associated "agreements" to
date. A key conclusion is that the GATS itself may be a robust
tool to apply competition policy to the liberalization in trade in
services. However, certain sectors require additional tailored
competitive safeguards in order to make parties willing to
accept reciprocal market access concessions. Furthermore, the
GATS shows some interesting architectural ways of introducing new and complicated subject matters into the WTO. This is
demonstrated in the sectoral "plurilateral" commitments in the

177. Id. at
Sector").
178. Id. at
179. Id.
180. S/L/64
181. Id. at

attach. 2 ("Disciplines on Domestic Regulation in the Accountancy
part III ("Licensing").
(Dec. 14, 1998), art. 4, para. 10.
art. 16, para. 2.
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Reference Paper with respect to Basic Telecommunications,
and in the Undertaking with respect to Financial Services. On
a more basic level, the Accounting Disciplines integrate a transitional concept of non-binding guidance into the framework of
WTO Agreements. In addition, each of these examples warrants further consideration to determine what general competition principles might be applied horizontally within the GATS
framework through the Article VI provisions on domestic regulation. I turn to that issue in the next section of the paper.

VI. AN EXPANDED GATS ARTICLE VI
82
Article VI of the GATS deals with domestic regulation."
At its most basic level, it provides that in sectors where specific commitments are undertaken, each Member shall ensure
that all measures of general application affecting trade in
services are administered in a reasonable, objective, and impartial manner." Further provisions require each Member to
maintain or institute as soon as practicable judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures which provide, at the
request of an affected service supplier, for the prompt review
of, and where justified, appropriate remedies for, administrative decisions affecting trade in services. However, these provisions are not to be construed to require a Member to institute
such tribunals or procedures where this would be inconsistent
with its constitutional structure or the nature of its legal system.M
Article VI:4 sets out specific rules to apply to measures
relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards, and licensing requirements to ensure that they
do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services."
The Council for Trade in Services is given the authority to
develop any necessary disciplines aimed at ensuring that such
requirements are, inter alia:

a. based on objective and transparent criteria, such as com-

182.
183.
184.
185.

GATS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 6.
S/1164 (Dec. 14, 1998), at art. 6, para. 1.
Id. at art. 6, para 2.
Id. at art. 6, para. 4.
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petence and the ability to supply the service;
b. not more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of the service; and
c. in the case of licensing procedures, not in themselves a
restriction on the supply of the service."
Pending the agreement on those disciplines, Article VI provides that in sectors in which a Member has undertaken specific commitments, the Member shall not apply licensing and
qualification requirements and technical standards that nullify
or impair such specific commitments.
As currently structured, Article VI applies to measures
relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing requirements. Arguably, competition law and policy may be relevant to all such measures. The
further requirement in Article VI is that such measures in
domestic regulations not constitute unnecessary barriers to
trade in services. Again, competition law and policy can be an
important instrument in ensuring that these measures are
administered in a way that pays particular attention to strategic or other regulatory barriers to trade in services.
The question that emerges is whether in the GATS 2000
negotiations, a means can be found to integrate more directly
certain competition law and policy concerns, and other competitive safeguards into Article VI.' 87 In other words, some consideration might also be given to further horizontal GATS
measures that have a more ex ante, pro-active effect in the
implementation of domestic regulation in a manner that also
serves to discipline certain anticompetitive measures affecting
international trade. In this regard, one could imagine some
combination of principles, perhaps akin to the six efficient
regulatory principles for market openness that have emerged

186. Id.
187. See Geza Feketekuty, Competition Policy and the WTO: Implications of
Recent Developments in the Services Sector, Paper Presented to the Third WTO
Symposium on Competition Policy and the Multilateral Trading System (Apr. 17,
1999): See also Geza Feketekuty, Market Competition and Regulatory Reform in
Services: Removing Obstacles to Competition and Growth, Paper Presented to a
Preparatory Conference Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute; the
Brookings Institute; the Center for Business and Government, Harvard University;
and the CSI Research and Education Foundation (June 1, 1999).
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from the OECD regulatory reform work described above."
Under this approach, one might consider building competition
principles to address interconnection and access issues, and
perhaps others as well into a revision of GATS Article VI, or
alternatively perhaps in the GATS Article XVI market access
commitments.
Relevant experience may be found in the history of Article
VI of the GATT 1947 which sets forth the discipline on
antidumping measures and the successive interpretations,
codes and understandings which culminated in the Uruguay
Round with the Agreement on the Interpretation of Article VI
of the GATT.' 9 One could consider a gradual expansion of
the GATS Article VI commitment through a similar iterative
process. This might be a useful option to consider to the extent
that a horizontal agreement on competition policy is not feasible at this time, or to the extent that an endless series of sectoral agreements with competition policy is not seen as desirable at this time.
One immediate way of conceptualizing this would be to
back the commitments in GATS Article VIII with respect to
monopoly leveraging, and Article IX with respect to
anticompetitive practices into an expanded understanding of
domestic regulatory requirements. Further insights might be
gained from looking at the experience in those sectors where
agreements embodying competition policy have already been
achieved. However, it should be plainly stated that not all such
features such as "essential facilities" concepts might properly
form part of a generic GATS Article VI competition provision."' This "half-way" house in a sense would build on the
important recognition of the ties between competition law and
policy and domestic regulation.
Of course, if this approach were adopted, consideration
would have to be given to striking the appropriate balance
between the other legitimate goals and policy rationales of
domestic regulation and the other principles that would be

188. See OECD Report on Regulatory Reform, supra note 128.
189. See GATS Agreement, supra note 1, at art. 6.
190. Recent OECD work on competition policy and regulation might also provide some useful insights. See OECD, Promoting Competition In Sectors With A
Non-Competitive Component: Report by the Secretariat,DAFFE/CLP/WP2(99)4 (Apr.
13, 1999).
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included in any further disciplines on domestic regulation. In
this regard, it may be worth considering how such other principles might relate to the existing GATS article VI:4, which
adopts "necessity" as the central rule to assess the compatibility with the GATS of trade restrictive domestic regulatory measures. The chapeau of article VI:4 identifies the main objective
of the disciplines on domestic regulation, which the Services
Council is called upon to develop: to ensure that "measures
relating to qualification requirements and procedures, technical standards and licensing procedures do not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade in services." 91
In the following section of the paper, I highlight potential
competition policy issues that might emerge for negotiation if a
sectoral approach to liberalization on trade in services is adopted. The competition concerns discussed might also be addressed using the iterative Article VI approach outlined above.

VII. OTHER SECTORAL ISSUES FOR COMPETITION POLICY IN THE

GATS
In this section of the paper, I briefly review some potential
competition policy issues to be addressed in further sectoral
GATS negotiations. At this stage, the analysis is of a summary
nature drawing on the GATS sectoral working background
notes and recent OECD studies.'92 My purpose here is to flag
some of the possible competition concerns that might arise as
the sectoral negotiations progress. My intention is not to be
definitive but rather to suggest some possible lines of consideration for negotiators.

191. To date, the Working Group on Article VI has focused on necessity, transparency, equivalence and mutual recognition. See generally WTO Council for Trade
in Services, Article W:4 of the GATS: Disciplines on Domestic Regulation Applicable to All Services: Note by the Secretariat,S/C/W196 (Mar. 1, 1999); WTO Working
Party on Domestic Regulation, Report on the Meeting Held May 17, 1999: Note by
the Secretariat, SIWPDRIMI1 (June 14, 1999); WTO Working Party on Domestic
Regulation, Report on the Meeting Held July 14, 1999: Note by the Secretariat,
S/WPDR/M/2 (Sept. 2, 1999).
192. The 20 WTO Sectoral Papers on Trade in Services,
at
http://www.wto.orgwtoservicesAv65.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2000).
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A. DistributionServices
A lot can be said about distribution services and the application of competition policy. However, since my goal is not to
settle that issue in this paper, at this stage, I simply pose
some questions for further analysis in the event that negotiations on liberalization in this sector is pursued. Do private
practices create welfare-reducing barriers to trade in distribution services? If so, is there a case for developing certain procompetitive regulatory to address those distortions? Alternatively, would excessively stringent competition policy norms
themselves inhibit the development of efficient distribution
arrangements? Is it sufficient for national competition law and
policy to be administered on a non-discriminatory basis in
examining distribution issues, or does entry into retailing by
foreign service providers require some special analysis to account for qualitative differences between foreign and domestic
firms?
B. Postal and Courier Services;93 Energy Services; Land
Transport Services - Rail Transport
These sectors are examples of network industries that are
similar to the telecommunications context discussed above.
These sectors raise a number of competition concerns ranging
from abuse of dominance to access to essential facilities. They
thus may be particularly well-suited for a consideration of the
extension of competitive safeguards similar in type to those set
forth in the Reference Paper with respect to Basic Telecommunications.

C. Air Transport Services
This sector seems to be particularly ripe for the consideration of competition policy safeguards for the liberalization of
trade in services. Among the issues that could be considered

193. See generally OECD, Promoting Competition in Postal Services Background
Note, DAFFE/CLP/WP2(99)1 (Jan. 27, 1999).
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are: abuse of dominance (by private or state-owned carriers);
price-fixing; market (slot) allocation; access to and use of essential (ground handling) facilities; and perhaps even predatory
pricing. 94 Some of these concerns might be more suited to
the approach taken in the Reference Paper.

D. Maritime TransportServices
In June 1996, the post-Uruguay Round negotiations on
liberalization in this sector were suspended, pending the resumption of comprehensive negotiations in the context of
GATS 2000.' Among the issues that could be considered in
future negotiations are: the application of competition policy
safeguards to liner shipping alliances (whether consortia or
conferences); the continued need for exemptions from competition laws; and the enforcement of laws against price fixing and
other cartel behaviour with respect to harbour services.

E. Land Transport Services - Road Transport
The road transport services is, unlike the other transportation services, not inherently a network industry. For that reason, concerns relating to monopolization and abuse of dominance using vertical restraints seem less important than horizontal concerns relating to bid-rigging, price-fixing, and market
allocation. In other words, a general competition law should
address the market access concerns in this sector. Other possible concerns relate to regulatory standard-setting measures
and licensing agreements administered in a discriminatory or
unnecessarily restrictive manner to the detriment of foreign
entrants. This sector also would seem to be an example of the
limitations of a purely sectoral approach to addressing competition concerns. It might be that multi-modal regulations upstream have downstream anti-competitive effects in the road
transport service sector.

194. See generally OECD, Competition Policy and InternationalAirport Services,
DAFFE/CLP(98)3 (May 14, 1999).
195. WTO, Decision on Maritime Transport Services, Adopted by the Council for
Trade in Services, June 26, 1996, Sf114 (July 3, 1996).
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F. Environmental Services
Several questions arise from the highly concentrated nature of this sector in most countries because of its "public monopoly" characteristics. How far do the disciplines of GATS
Article VIII ensure that the behavior of monopolies supplying
environmental services is not discriminatory? Is there a case
for developing certain pro-competitive regulatory principles?
Are broad exemptions from the application of competition policy necessary in order to achieve the objectives of the regulations that give rise to this industry in many cases?

G. Construction and Related EngineeringServices
This sector raises a number of potential competition problems for which competition policy safeguards might be considered in the context of future negotiations. These concerns
range from concerns about bid-rigging and other cartel
behavior, to licensing and standard setting concerns.

H. Audiovisual Services
With the increased number and variety of network-based
services, competition policy also needs to play a much greater
role in the regulation of audiovisual content. However, the
evolutionary nature of convergence also means that competition policy may need to be applied with a more constant and
detailed attention to market, sectoral, product and technological evolution. Given the political sensitivity of this sector in
some countries, perhaps some benefit could be gained by
studying the balance between the competitive safeguards and
universal service requirements in the Reference Paper with
respect to Basic Telecommunications.

I. Advertising Services; Legal Services; Architectural and
Engineering Services; Education Services; Health and Human
Services
The basic approach to issues of licensing in the accounting

358

BROOK. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XKVI:2

disciplines might be applicable in these sectors also. However,
the issues of concern are potentially deeper than just ones of
licensing in the professions, but also market operation such as
restrictions on advertising, and horizontally, who gets to participate in the decision making process on market regulation?
Consideration might also be given to the transitional architecture of non-binding guidance in the Accounting Disciplines to
begin to apply competition principles to cross-border trade in
professional services.

J. Tourism Services
This sector does not appear at first glance to present the
need for any particular competition policy safeguards. However, in some cases, licensing agreements might be granted in
anticompetitive ways, and local or national service providers
might still be granted preferential treatment that gives rise to
concerns about monopolization or abuses of dominant provisions. The tourism sector is a good example of how downstream service sectors can be affected by anticompetitive upstream behavior. For instance, tourism might very well be
affected by anticompetitive distortions caused in transportation
(air, rail, or maritime) or in advertising. Thus, it is a good
illustration of how a purely sectoral approach to dealing with
competition concerns might not yield the full benefits of trade
in services.

K

Computer and Related Services

IThis sector may be characterized by some
aspects of network industries. To that extent, it may share some of the same
competition concerns relating to access to essential facilities
that were identified above in relation to other service sectors.
It is also a sector that may demonstrate the limitations of a
sectoral approach to dealing with competition concerns. For
instance, it may be that restrictions and distortions in another
service sector such as telecommunications are also the source
of competitive distortions downstream in this sector.
In this section of the paper, I have tried to sketch out
some preliminary ideas of where competition concerns might
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arise in various service sectors, and where those restrictions
might have adverse effects on trade in services. As negotiations
proceed, much more detailed work will have to be done to put
flesh on these bones. The Table below represents an attempt to
draw some subjective impressionistic judgements about the
relative importance of various rudimentary competition concerns in each sector. Each sector is analyzed to give an idea
where horizontal concerns (agreements among competitors),
vertical concerns (agreements between firms at different levels
of production and distribution), abuse of dominance, and exceptions/exemptions from national competition laws might pose
problems. The problems are rated from low to high with high
being the greatest source of concern, and low being a very
minor level of concern. At some later stage, one could think of
grouping the identified concerns in a way that might be useful
for an expanded GATS article VI. On first impression, it appears, however, that simply bringing GATS article VIII and IX
more closely into the ambit of article VI would provide a first
stab at a more robust approach to achieving pro-competitive
domestic regulation in a manner that promotes trade in services.
TABLE I: POTENTIAL COMPETITION CONCERNS BY SERVICE SECTOR

SERVICE
SECTOR

HORIZONTAL
CONCERNS

VERTICAL
CONCERNS

ABUSE
OF DOMINANCE

EXCEPTIONS
EXEMPTIONS

Distribu-

Medium

High

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

High

High

Low

High

High

High

tion

Postal
and Courier

Energy
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High

Medium

Low

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

High

Environmental

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

Construction and
Related
Engi-

High

Low

Medium

Low

Low

Low

High

High

Medium

Low

Low

Medium

Legal

High

Low

Low

Medium

Architectural and
Engi-

High

Low

Low

Medium

port -

Road

Land
Transport -

Rail
Air
Transport

Maritime
Transport

neering

Audiovisual

Advertising

neering
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Education

Low

Low

Low

High

Health
and Human

High

Medium

Medium

High

Tourism

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Comput-

Low

Medium

Medium

Low

"er and

Related
Services

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I have examined the GATS implications of
integrating competition policy disciplines in the WTO. However, at present, it seems unlikely that comprehensive binding
horizontal competition rule-making will be successful. By contrast, I demonstrated that the existing GATS and its associated sectoral "agreements" are fairly robust instruments for
integrating competition policy safeguards into sectoral liberalization initiatives, and perhaps more broadly to domestic regulation by some iterative expansion of GATS article VI. In this
context, I suggested that in thinking about GATS article VI,
the experience under GATS articles VIII and IX, and the provisions in the Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper, Financial Services Undertaking, and Accounting Disciplines deserve
much closer scrutiny. If an incremental sectoral approach to
integrating competition policy into the WTO is pursued, then I
also showed possible issues for consideration in each of the
identified service sectors identified by the Council for Trade in
Services.
Finally, this paper also showed that apart from sectoral insights, the provisions in the Basic Telecommunications Reference Paper, Financial Services Undertaking, and Accounting
Disciplines offer useful architectural approaches to thinking
about horizontal rule-making in competition policy within the
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WTO. These architectural insights apply both to the context of
binding rules, and non-binding rules within the WTO.
Whatever the approach taken to integrate competition
policy disciplines into the WTO, there is no mistaking the fact
that it will be difficult to achieve the optimal benefit from the
liberalization of trade and investment without some serious
consideration of issues of competition. It may well be that
without the integration of competition policy disciplines in
some manner, it will also be very difficult politically for countries to make the necessary reciprocal market access concessions that are essential to moving significantly beyond the
status quo.

